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Abstract
We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of
oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that
oil windfalls escalate conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they de-escalate
conflict in offshore-rich countries. We use a model to illustrate how these oppo-
site effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the
government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while
onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide
empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil price windfalls
increase both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich
countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.
Keywords
natural resources, conflict
Oil is often considered responsible for fueling civil conflicts and wars - both as a
source of funding for the contenders and as a prize for the fighting. Anecdotal
evidence consistent with this argument abounds: examples of recent oil-related
episodes of conflict include ISIL’s strategic control of resources in Syria and Iraq,
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oil theft by MEND rebels in Nigeria, and attacks to extraction facilities by Darfur
insurgents in South Sudan. 1
Despite the popularity of the argument, establishing a systematic nexus between oil
wealth and conflict has proved complex, since oil-rich countries display large varia-
tions in measures of internal stability. While countries like Iraq and Nigeria are often
cited as examples of the nefarious consequences of oil abundance on conflict, other
countries, as diverse as Qatar, Norway and Gabon, have never experienced a civil
conflict over the past 40 years in spite of their vast oil wealth. Yet other countries, like
Angola and Azerbaijan, have even put an end to their conflicts in correspondence to
large increases in oil wealth. Indeed, while early cross-sectional studies generally
found a positive association between oil wealth and the onset and duration of conflicts
and wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Le Billon 2003), more
recent studies focusing on within-country variation find mixed evidence on the rela-
tionship (e.g. Bazzi and Blattman 2014; Lei and Michaels 2014).
In this paper, we take a fresh look at the oil-conflict nexus by analyzing how
conflict and war escalations depend on the location of oil, using new
industry-licensed data allowing us to distinguish between onshore and offshore
production. In a large panel of countries, we first confirm the insignificant average
effect of oil wealth on the probability of conflict, consistent with the existing incon-
clusive evidence (Brückner and Ciccone 2010; Cotet and Tsui 2013; Bazzi and
Blattman 2014; Ciccone 2018). We then show how this zero-result may be attributed
to opposite-sign effects of onshore and offshore oil. While greater onshore oil wealth
makes conflict and civil war outbreaks and escalations more likely, greater offshore
oil wealth tends to de-escalate conflicts.
To reach these conclusions we use exogenous fluctuations in international oil
prices, weighted by each country’s average shares of onshore and offshore produc-
tion in GDP. The effects we document are both statistically and economically
significant. For a large onshore producer like Iraq, our estimates suggest that a one
standard deviation increase in the price of oil raises the probability of conflict
escalation by 3 percentage points, or 28% compared to its average probability. For
a large offshore producer like Azerbaijan, instead, a similar oil price windfall
reduces the probability of conflict escalation by 1.6 percentage points, or 39% of
its mean. In general, we show that the overall impact of oil price windfalls shifts
from reducing to increasing the probability of conflict escalation when the share of
onshore oil exceeds about 38% of total production.
We attribute the opposite effect of oil price windfalls in onshore- and offshore-rich
countries to their differential impact on the fighting capacities of the contenders. We
argue that a crucial difference between offshore and onshore facilities is that the latter
can more easily be attacked, looted, and even seized by rebel groups, which in turn can
use the proceeds from the looting to maintain and equip their troops. Thus, oil price
windfalls increase relatively more the fighting capacity of rebels compared to the
government, the larger is the share of onshore oil production for any given share of
offshore (or total) oil production in GDP. Conversely, oil price windfalls tilt the balance
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of power in favor of the government more, the larger is the share of production obtained
from offshore facilities, which are easier to defend and whose proceeds almost exclu-
sively accrue to the central government.
We document the empirical relevance of the fighting capacity mechanism using a
rebel strength indicator that measures the ability of active rebel groups to maintain
and equip troops, relative to the government (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan
2013). Consistent with our interpretation, an increase in the price of oil raises the
indicator of rebels’ strength in onshore-rich countries, while it decreases it in
offshore-rich countries.
To get a better sense of the sort of episodes driving our empirical analysis, consider
the case of Indonesia. During the early 1970s, the discovery of vast oil and gas fields in
the northern region of Aceh almost doubled the country’s oil production, 80% of which
proceeded from onshore sources. The spike in production, coupled with the fourfold
increase in the price of oil during the 1973 crisis, were instrumental to the consolidation
of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), an insurgency movement that aimed at securing
larger shares of the oil rents to the local population (Schulze 2006). In 1976 the group
launched an offensive against the central government.2 During the following three
years, characterized by soaring oil prices, the number of GAM rebels and their strength
relative to the government increased, resulting in a large scale civil conflict. Only
around 1980, with oil prices starting to decline sharply, did the central government
manage to defeat the insurgency, and the group’s leader fled the country.
Now consider instead the case of Angola, where, at the end of the 1990s, new
deep-water exploration technologies made it possible to double offshore oil produc-
tion, which came to represent 80% of the country’s GDP. The increased offshore
production, together with the sustained increase in oil prices (an average annual
growth rate of 60% between 1998 and 2000) enabled the government to mortgage
future oil revenues, purchase weapons on the international arms market and, in 1999,
launch an offensive against the rebels of the National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA) (Le Billon 2007). The offensive led to the destruction of
UNITA as a conventional military force, paving the way for the end of a civil war
that had been going on since the country’s independence in 1975.3
To guide our empirical analysis, we open the paper with a model a la Tullock
(1980) in which the government and a rebel group fight over power and, thereby, the
control of oil resources. In the baseline version of the model, the probability of
winning the conflict depends on the relative fighting capacity of the contenders
(e.g., their relative abilities to maintain and equip troops). Our simple theoretical
innovation is to let the fighting capacities be functions of oil and its geographical
location. Crucially, we assume that both onshore and offshore oil income contribute
to the fighting capacity of the central government, but only onshore oil contributes to
the fighting capacity of the rebels. A straightforward implication of this assumption
is that an oil windfall raises the fighting capacity of the rebels relative to the
government when the share of onshore production is sufficiently large – that is,
above what we call the fighting capacity threshold.
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Incorporating the fighting capacity mechanism into the baseline model also allows
us to identify an equilibrium conflict threshold. This represents the share of onshore
production above which an oil windfall raises the probability of conflict escalation.
The equilibrium conflict threshold lies below the fighting capacity threshold, because
it also accounts for the value of holding power (a state prize effect). Hence, the two
thresholds effectively identify three ranges for the share of onshore oil production. If
the share is low (i.e. below the equilibrium conflict threshold), an oil price shock
mostly benefits the government, weakening the rebels and increasing the probability
of a conflict de-escalation. If, on the contrary, the share of onshore production is high
(i.e. above the fighting capacity threshold), the shock benefits mostly the rebels,
raising their fighting capacity and increasing the probability of conflict. Finally, if
the share of onshore production lies between the two thresholds, an oil price shock
increases the probability of conflict escalation in spite of making the government
relatively stronger. Intuitively, this is because – at intermediate values of onshore
production – the increased value of holding power (the state prize effect) more than
compensate the rebels for the reduced probability of winning the conflict (the fighting
capacity effect), motivating them to intensify their conflict activities despite having
become relatively weaker compared to the government.
Both the fighting capacity and the equilibrium conflict thresholds depend on
parameters that may vary across countries. In particular, when onshore facilities are
easily lootable or when rebels are more effective than the government in transforming
resources into fighting capacity, the share of onshore wealth at which oil windfalls tilt
the fighting capacity in favour of the rebels is (potentially much) lower. In this way,
the model can also account for cases like Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo,
where the limited state apparatus hampers the ability to secure onshore facilities and
transform oil revenues into military power, making them subject to frequent spikes in
rebel activity and conflict in spite of the limited share of onshore oil production.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 places our contribution in the related
literature. Section 3 formulates a \simple model and derives the main hypotheses.
Section 4 establishes the empirical model derived from the theory. Section 5 intro-
duces the data. Section 6 provides the results from the empirical analysis, while
Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
An early and influential literature in political science and economics investigates the
relationship between resource abundance – oil in particular – and civil conflict and
war, using predominantly cross-country variation (Le Billon 2003; Fearon and Lai-
tin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These studies generally point to a positive
relationship between resource abundance and incidence of conflict and war. More
recent studies, however, argue that identification of causal effects can be achieved
with greater confidence using within-country variation. When focusing on
within-country variation and using exogenous price shocks or resource discoveries
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for empirical identification, the results are largely inconclusive. Lei and Michaels
(2014) find that giant oil discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed con-
flicts within 4-8 years of discovery. However, Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Bazzi and
Blattman (2014) do not find a significant association between changes in oil wealth
and the probability of civil war onset, while Brückner and Ciccone (2010) and
Ciccone (2018) find that commodity price downturns provoke civil war onset in
Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. We add on this literature by, first, making a clear
distinction between the conflict effects of onshore and offshore oil extraction. Sec-
ond, rather than focusing exclusively on either conflict or war onsets or incidence,
we propose a more unified framework, where events may escalate from peace to
conflict, from conflict to war or directly from peace to war
The only studies we are aware of that explicitly focus on the location of oil to
investigate civil conflict in a cross-country setting are Ross (2006) and Lujala (2010).
Both studies hypothesize that only oil located onshore should be expected to ignite or
increase conflict, due to conflict financing mechanisms or secessionist motives. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, they find that only onshore oil is associated with the onset
of conflict, not oil that is extracted offshore (see also Ross 2012). One important
difference with these studies is that we break down the country’s production by
location, rather than relying on dummy variables to indicate offshore and onshore
production, which allows us to account for the intensive margin of oil production.
More broadly, we improve upon this earlier research by demonstrating empirically
that oil lootability helps explain the location-specific effects, by considering a wider
range of conflict escalation and de-escalation outcomes, and by showing that offshore
oil is indeed associated with conflict de-escalation. A further concern with the existing
studies is that they do not account for time-invariant country characteristics and global
trends, potentially related to oil production and conflict. We overcome these short-
comings by focusing on within-country changes in oil wealth over time, weighting
exogenous changes in international oil prices by the average share of onshore and
offshore oil production in GDP. Finally, we contribute by developing a more complete
and explicit theory to rationalize our hypotheses and findings.
Our identification strategy is similar to that used in the literature investigating the
effects of income shocks induced by commodity price changes (Brückner and Ciccone
2010; Berman and Couttenier 2015; Caselli and Tesei 2016; Dube and Vargas 2013).
An important distinction in these studies has to do with the extent of capital and labor
intensity of different commodities. Dube and Vargas (2013), for example, show that
price shocks to the capital-intensive oil sector in Colombia are positively related to
violent conflict, while the relationship is negative for the labor-intensive coffee sector.
This lends support to the hypothesis that oil income fosters rent-seeking behavior by
increasing the state prize, while income from coffee triggers an opportunity cost effect
by increasing worker wages. Our results show that other characteristics of natural
resources contribute to explain their tendency to fuel conflict. We argue in particular
that, while onshore and offshore oil are similar in terms of capital intensity, they are
asymmetrically appropriable by the two sides in conflict, thus affecting the relative
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fighting capacities of government and rebels and the ensuing probability of conflict
escalation.4 This interpretation, based on the different ability of government and rebels
to access onshore and offshore oil facilities, echoes similar arguments on the importance
of conflict financing (e.g. Fearon 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). This is also
in line with recent empirical evidence by Berman et al. (2017), who show that the
appropriation of mining revenues by rebel groups contributes to the spreading of con-
flict to other parts of the country, something the authors attribute to the increased
financial ability to sustain larger-scale insurgency.
Our focus on the fighting capacity of the contenders is complementary to other
explanations of the impact of oil abundance on conflict. The already mentioned state
prize hypothesis suggests that oil abundance increases the probability of conflict esca-
lation by raising the prize that can be seized through the capture of the state (Bates,
Greif, and Singh 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Alternative explanations focus on the
lack of incentives for rentier states to develop a strong state capacity, which eventually
makes them less able to prevent rebellions (Dunning 2008; Ross 2012); and on the
inability of incumbent governments to credibly commit to oil rents redistribution, which
exacerbate grievances of the excluded groups (Fearon 2004; Besley and Persson 2011).5
While these theories aim to explain the incidence of conflict in oil-rich countries, they
cannot account for the opposite effect of onshore and offshore oil windfalls on the
probability of conflict escalations observed in our data.
Our results are also broadly related to the class of contributions that have inves-
tigated the effects of oil price windfalls on political-economy outcomes other than
civil conflict. For example, Haber and Menaldo (2011) and Brückner, Ciccone, and
Tesei (2012) present empirical evidence on oil abundance and democratization.
Andersen et al. (2017), Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Dalgaard and Olsson
(2008) look at oil windfalls and hidden wealth and corruption; Andersen and Aslak-
sen (2013) and Deaton and Miller (1996) at incumbents’ survival; and Caselli,
Morelli, and Rohner (2014) at international war.
Finally, our paper relates to Nordvik (2018), who studies the prevalence of coups
d’etat in oil rich countries and documents strong asymmetries in the onshore-
offshore dimension. While coups and civil conflict are different processes, our
findings confirm that the location of oil may affect the political incentives of both
incumbent governments and oppositions.
A Model of Oil Location and Conflict
Preliminaries
We consider an economy with both onshore and offshore oil production, occupied
by two equally sized groups, the government (G) and the opposition (O). The
groups engage in a violent conflict over the oil resources Q with value P, both
exogenously given.
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A minor share dn of the oil continuously leaks to the opposition (via, for example,
looting or extortion), where d is a ‘looting’ parameter and n is the share of the oil that
is produced onshore.6 The government oil revenues are thus given by
RG  1 dnð ÞQP, while RO  dnQP revenues are controlled by the opposition.7
We assume that the loot is small relative to total oil production (i.e., dn 1=2),
which ensures that the opposition has a strong incentive to fight for government
control.
We model the fight over the government oil revenues using a Tullock-type
conflict framework (Hirshleifer 1991; Skaperdas 1996).8 The win probability of
group i (i ¼ G;O) can be defined as pieiP
j¼G;O
pjej
(the “contest success function”), where
pi is the relative fighting capacity of the group (e.g. its ability to equip troops with
weapons) and the strategic choice variable ei is the extent of troops mobilization
carried out by the group in the conflict. In the conflict equilibrium below, ei thus
represents a measure of conflict intensity, and positive and negative changes in ei
capture conflict escalations and de-escalations, respectively.
The Fighting Capacity Mechanism
Crucially, we assume that oil revenues do not only constitute a motive for the
conflict, but they also provide the means for fighting. An increase in the value of
the resources looted by the rebels increases their fighting capacity relative to the
government, while the opposite happens when the value of the offshore resources in
the hands of the government increases.9
More technically, we assume that group i‘s fighting capacity





depends positively on its revenues, that is,
df i Rið Þ=dRi > 0. Clearly,
P
j¼G;O
pj ¼ 1 and pG > 1=2 (since, by assumption,
dn < 1=2).10
We first derive the effect of an oil price shock on the relative fighting capacity of
the government, dpG
dP




.) It is straightforward to show
that dpG
dP
may be either positive or negative, depending on whether the onshore oil
share n is below or above a fighting capacity threshold n, defined as:
n ¼ 1





< 0 if n > n
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We summarize this result in the following proposition:11
PROPOSITION 1: The fighting capacity mechanism A positive oil price
shock: (i) increases the fighting capacity of the government relative to the
opposition if the share of onshore oil in the economy is sufficiently small, that
is if n < n; (ii) increases the fighting capacity of the opposition relative to the
government if the onshore oil share is sufficiently large, that is if n > n.
The fighting capacity threshold in equation (3.1) is a function of the share of
onshore oil looted, d, and of the fighting capacity effectiveness of the opposition
relative to the government, gOG  jOjG, where ji 
dfi=f Rið Þ
dRi
describes the change in
group i‘s fighting capacity per dollar change in the group’s oil revenues. Considered
together, equations (3.1) and (3.2) suggest that the more effective the opposition is in
converting oil funds into fighting capacity relative to the government (i.e., the higher
is gOG), and the higher the overall level of looting (i.e., the higher is d), the more
likely it is that an oil price windfall will reduce the relative fighting capacity of the
government (at any given share of onshore production n), effectively reducing the
threshold level n.
Conflict Equilibrium
We assume that each group is summarized by a representative agent with risk neutral
preferences. Group i‘s expected payoff from mobilizing troops and fighting can thus
be expressed as:








RG is the expected economic benefit of gaining control of govern-
ment oil, and the term Wei is the expected economic cost for group i of mobilizing ei
troops. We may interpret W as the income earned on the labor (and capital) markets
per unit of ei, which we take as exogenous.
The following timing of events describes the game between the government and
the opposition:
1. Nature determines the state of the world, given by the shape of f i Rið Þ and the
vector n; d;Q;P;W½ .
2. Each group i simultaneously determines its level of troop mobilization, ei,
taking its own and the other group’s expected payoff functions in equation
(3.3) as given.
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3. Payoffs are distributed across the government and the opposition according
to the contest success function.
In the resulting game, all the strategic action takes place at Stage 2, where each
group i maximizes equation 3:3ð Þ with respect to ei, taking the other group’s max-
imization as given. Since the groups’ expected payoff functions are symmetric, the
solution to this problem implies a fully symmetric equilibrium level of troop




and where O  pGpO represents the power balance between the two contenders.12 In
the following, we consider e a measure of equilibrium conflict intensity, assumed
proportional to the equilibrium level of troop mobilization.
Oil price shocks influence the conflict intensity e in two ways. First, through a
standard state prize mechanism, whereby oil windfalls increase the government oil
revenues RG and raise the incentives to fight. Second, via the fighting capacity
mechanism introduced in Section 3.2, since oil windfalls also change the balance









RG þ O dRGdP
W
; ð3:5Þ




RG) in the numerator captures the fighting capacity
mechanism and the second term (O dRG
dP
) the state prize mechanism.
Importantly, the overall effect of an oil price windfall on the equilibrium level of
conflict is ambiguous, depending on its effect on the relative fighting capacity of the





¼ 0, we derive an expression for the equilibrium conflict threshold of the onshore
oil share, n, defined as:







> 0 if n > n




In equation 3.6, R  QP is the total value of oil production in the economy.
Notice that, because 1
12pGð ÞjGR
< 0, we have that n < n.14
We summarize the results on the conflict effect of an oil price shock in the
following proposition:15
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PROPOSITION 2: The conflict effect of an oil price shock A positive oil
price shock: (i) de-escalates the equilibrium level of conflict if the share of
onshore oil in the economy is sufficiently small, that is if n < n; (ii) escalates
equilibrium conflict if the onshore oil share is sufficiently large, that is if
n > n.
The results in Proposition 2 are graphically illustrated in Figure 1, which presents a
schematic representation of the marginal effects of oil price windfalls on the equilibrium
level of conflict (equation 3.7) and on the relative fighting capacity of the government
(equation 3.2), both calculated as a function of the share of onshore oil production.
Starting with the marginal effect on the relative fighting capacity of the govern-
ment, this is represented by the downward-sloping line in the figure. The effect turns
from positive to negative when the share of onshore oil n > n (the fighting capacity
threshold), above which an oil windfall raises relatively more the fighting capacity
of the rebels. The marginal effect on the equilibrium level of conflict, on the
contrary, is increasing in the share of onshore oil produced and changes from
negative to positive when n > n (the equilibrium conflict threshold), above which
an oil windfall raises the probability of conflict.
The intersection of the two lines with the x-axis identifies three areas for the
relationship between oil price shocks and conflict escalation. At high shares of
onshore oil production (n > n), an oil windfall raises the probability of conflict
escalation, by increasing both the prize at stake and the relative fighting capacity
of the rebels, thus unequivocally raising their incentives to fight. The opposite
happens at low shares of onshore oil production (n < n), where instead an oil wind-
fall de-escalates conflict. This happens because, when most of the production is
located offshore, the windfall profits mostly accrue to the government, shifting the
power balance in its favour and counterbalancing the increased incentives of the
rebels to fight for the larger government revenues.16 Finally, at intermediate shares
of onshore oil production (n < n < n) an oil windfall escalates conflict despite the
fact that the government becomes relatively stronger compared to the rebels. The
intuition for this result is that, in this region, the increased value of holding power
(the state prize effect) is sufficiently large to compensate the rebels for the reduced
probability of winning the conflict (the conflict capacity effect).
From the Model to the Empirics
The simple model presented in Section 3 delivers a number of testable implications
that we bring to the data. First, the model predicts that a positive oil price shock is
expected to escalate the conflict intensity if the share of onshore oil is above a certain
level (“the equilibrium conflict threshold”, n), while conflict is expected to
de-escalate if the onshore share is below this level. Second, following an oil price
windfall, the fighting capacity of the opposition is expected to increase relative to the
government if the share of onshore oil is sufficiently high (above “the conflict
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capacity threshold”, n), while it is the government that grows relatively stronger if
the onshore share is below this level. Finally, the conflict capacity threshold is
expected to be (weakly) higher than the equilibrium conflict threshold (i.e., n > n).
We test these predictions in the following empirical model, which maps directly
from the theory:17
Dyit ¼ b1yonsi DPrt þ b2y
off
i DPrt þ mi þ dt þ eit ; ð4:1Þ
where Dyit is an indicator for a change in conflict status (onset, escalation,
de-escalation, termination) or a change in the rebels’ relative strength, DPrt is the
oil price growth rate, mi captures country fixed effects, dt captures a common time
trend, and eit is an error term clustered at the country level. The variables y
ons
i and
yoffi are (time invariant) measures of the onshore and offshore oil intensities (i.e.,
ratios of the values of onshore and offshore oil production, respectively, to GDP).
The coefficient estimates of b1 and b2 capture that the impact of oil price shocks
should be greater in countries with greater oil production over GDP. Interpreting the
empirical coefficients in the light of our theory, we expect b1 to be positive and b2
to be negative, in both the conflict and the rebel strength regressions. In addition,
Figure 1. Marginal effects of oil price windfalls as a function of the share of onshore oil. Note:
The Figure shows the marginal effects of oil price windfalls on the equilibrium level of conflict
(equation 3.7) and on the relative fighting capacity of the government (equation 3.2), both
calculated as a function of the share of onshore oil produced.
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given some estimates of b1 and b2, the (in sample) equilibrium conflict (n) and
fighting capacity (n) thresholds correspond to  b2b1b2 in their respective empirical
estimations.18
Data and Summary Statistics
In order to recover the parameters of equation (4.1), we first construct measures of
onshore and offshore petroleum intensity using data from Rystad Energy’s UCube
database (2013). Rystad is an independent oil and gas consulting services company
headquartered in Oslo, Norway, which collects production data from oil and gas
companies’ annual reports as well as authorities’ historical production accounts.
Based on their data, we calculate for each country the average share of onshore and
offshore oil production in GDP over the sample period 1962-2009. We check the
quality of the Rystad Energy data against the total share of oil production in GDP
from the World Development Indicators and find a correlation of 0.99 between the
two measures.
Online Appendix Table A.1 reports the averages of total, onshore and offshore oil
production as share of GDP for all countries in our sample. A large number of
countries produce significant amounts of oil: on average, oil accounts for more than
1% of GDP in 51 countries and more than 5% in 33. There is also significant
variation in the onshore/offshore composition of total production. Among countries
with at least an average 5% share of total oil production in GDP, 19 produce more
onshore than offshore (10 onshore only), while 14 produce more offshore than
onshore (4 offshore only).
We interact our country-specific weights of onshore and offshore production with
oil price data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy.19 We assume that
annual changes in the oil price are stationary and can be interpreted as oil price
shocks, while the price level follows a random walk. This is in line with previous
studies (Liang and McDermott 1999; Brückner, Ciccone, and Tesei 2012) and is
confirmed by a variety of tests of stationarity on our oil price series.20
The conflict data come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch
et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Civil conflict is defined for armed
confrontations resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year, while the
threshold for civil war is set at 1,000 battle-related deaths. We use these data to
construct our main dependent variables. First, a conflict escalation dummy, equal
to one when a country’s conflict status changes from peace to conflict (or directly to
war), or from conflict to war, and zero otherwise. Second, a conflict de-escalation
dummy, defined analogously for reductions in conflict intensity.21
We measure the relative strength of rebel groups using data from the Non-State
Actor (NSA) database (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). The dataset
provides an indicator on the military capabilities of non-state actors relative to the
government in ongoing civil conflicts in the UCDP/PRIO dataset. The rebel strength
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indicator ranges from 1 to 5 (from “much weaker” to “much stronger than the
government”), and is based on observations of the number of troops possessed by
the rebel group(s) relative to the government.22 Governments may be facing con-
temporaneous conflict dyads with different rebel groups. For each conflict-year we
calculate the average and maximum strength of rebel groups, as well as their
number.23
Key summary statistics for the full sample of countries are reported in Table 1.
The average share of total oil in GDP is 6.4%, roughly two thirds of which come
from onshore production (4.0%) and the remainder from offshore production (2.4%).
The total number of oil producing countries is 87, two thirds of which (59 countries)
produce mainly or only from onshore sources, with the remaining 28 countries
producing mainly or only from offshore sources. The geographic distribution of
onshore and offshore producers in the sample is illustrated by a world map in
Figure 2. Turning to the measures of conflict intensity, both escalations and
de-escalations are relatively infrequent events, which jointly account for about 6%
of total observations in the sample, compared to an overall conflict incidence of
14%. Table 1 also details the average number of rebel groups faced by the govern-
ment (0.31, ranging from 0 to 11) and their average strength according to the relative
strength indicator (0.31, ranging from 0 to 5).
The simple cross-country association between the location of oil and the extent of
conflict can be appreciated in Figure 3. The left panel ranks the 15 oil producers (at
least 1% of GDP) with the highest incidence of civil conflict between 1962 and
2009, distinguishing them by the location of their main oil facilities. The right panel
performs a similar exercise, but focusing on conflict escalation. In both panels,
onshore producers represent the clear majority of conflict countries, consistent with
Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Mean SD Min Max
Total oil share .064 .130 0 .596
Onshore share .040 .096 0 .512
Offshore share .024 .075 0 .583
Oil price change .075 .292 -.650 1.260
Conflict escalation .033 .180 0 1
Conflict de-escalation .031 .175 0 1
Conflict incidence .137 .344 0 1
Avg. rebel strength .292 .704 0 5
Max rebel strength .311 .748 0 5
N. of rebel groups .312 .921 0 11
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the 132 countries in our sample. Rows 1, 2 and 3 report
information about shares of oil production in GDP. Row 4 reports oil’s yearly growth rate. Rows 5, 6 and
7 report information about different measures of conflict intensity, while rows 8, 9 and 10 about different
measures of rebels’ strength.












































































































































































the hypothesis that onshore facilities are more easily looted by rebels, providing the
means to fight and increasing the probability of conflict. In the following, we move
beyond cross-country correlations and turn to a formal quantitative analysis of the
relationship between oil location and conflict to substantiate this interpretation.
Results
Main Results
Table 2 investigates the impact of oil price windfalls on conflict escalation (columns
1 and 2) and de-escalation (columns 3 and 4). In column (1), we start by estimating a
constrained version of model (4.1), where the location of oil plays no role (i.e.,
where b1 ¼ b2). Consistent with previous studies, we find a small and statistically
insignificant average effect of oil price shocks on conflict escalation. In column (2),
we move to test more directly our theoretical predictions, allowing the coefficients
b1 and b2 to be different. The estimates reveal a heterogeneous response to oil price
windfalls in onshore and offshore countries, as predicted by our model. A one
standard deviation increase in the price of oil is associated with an 8% increase in
the probability of conflict escalation for average onshore producers, but to a 3%
decrease in the same probability for average offshore producers.24
Figure 3. Civil conflict and the location of oil. Note: The Figure ranks the 15 oil producers
with the most conflict escalations over the period 1962-2009, separated into onshore and
offshore producers.
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Clearly, many countries produce a combination of both onshore and offshore oil.
It is therefore interesting to calculate the share of onshore oil at which the effect of
oil windfalls turns from having a negative to a positive impact on conflict escalation.
This corresponds to the equilibrium conflict threshold n in our theory. We estimate
this threshold to be at 38% of onshore oil in total production.25 Countries with a
share of onshore production above the threshold include conflict-ridden ones like
Syria, Sudan, Libya, Iraq and Chad, while countries below the threshold include
relatively stable oil-rich countries like Azerbaijan, Cameroon and Mexico.
Turning to the estimates of the probability of conflict de-escalation, the results in
column (3) confirm the small and statistically insignificant average effect of oil price
shocks. As in the case of escalation, however, this masks considerable heterogeneity
in the response to oil windfalls by onshore and offshore producers. Estimates in
column (4) indicate that oil windfalls reduce the probability of conflict de-escalation
for onshore countries, while they raise it for offshore countries, with an effect that is
statistically significant at the 5% level.
We find a similar pattern of results in Table 3, where we restrict to the subset of
events of conflict onset and termination, as well as to the overall incidence of
conflict.26 Oil price windfalls appear to raise the probability of conflict onset and
incidence among onshore oil producers, as well as to reduce the probability of
terminating an existing conflict in these countries. The opposite happens in
offshore-producing countries. The estimates are statistically and economically
Table 2. Conflict and the Location of Oil Production.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Conflict
Escalation De-escalation
DPr  Total 0.081 0.005
(0.073) (0.040)
DPr  Onshore 0.229** -0.061
(0.107) (0.044)
DPr  Offshore -0.143*** 0.106**
(0.053) (0.051)
N. of countries 132 132 132 132
Observations 6,204 6,204 6,204 6,204
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is an indicator variable equal to one for all conflict
escalations, from peace to civil conflict (or directly to civil war) and from civil conflict to civil war. The
dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is defined similarly for conflict de-escalations. DPr  Total is the
percentage change in the price of crude oil from period t-1 to t, multiplied by the average share of total oil
in GDP over the sample period. DPr  Onshore and DPr  Offshore measure the percentage change in the
price of crude oil from period t-1 to t, multiplied by the country’s average share of onshore and offshore
oil in GDP, respectively. All specifications include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. Significantly different from zero at the *90% level, **95% level, ***99% level.
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meaningful. For example, according to the estimates in column (1) of Table 3, a 30%
increase in the price of oil - similar to what observed at the beginning of the first Gulf
war or in the aftermath of the 2011 financial crisis - triples the probability of starting
a conflict in large onshore producers like Iraq. For large offshore producers like
Azerbaijan, on the contrary, a similar oil price shock reduces the probability of
initiating a conflict by 25%, while it increases the probability of ending an existing
conflict by more than 50%.27
Overall, the empirical estimates in Table 2 and Table 3 provide support for the
main theoretical prediction in Proposition 2, namely that oil price windfalls have
opposite effects on the escalation and intensity of conflict depending on whether oil
is produced onshore or offshore. We now move to test the second prediction of our
model, that these heterogeneous effects are due to the different impact that windfalls
have on the balance of power between contenders in onshore and offshore producing
countries.
To test the fighting capacity mechanism, in Table 4 we estimate model (4.1)
where the dependent variable is now the change between t  1 and t in the relative
strength of rebels vis-à-vis the government. We consider different measures of
strength: in column (1) we calculate the number of rebel groups; in column (3) the
average strength of all rebel groups; in column (5) the strength of the strongest
group. Irrespective of the measure considered, the estimated coefficients are in line
with the predictions of our theoretical model: oil price windfalls increase the number
and strength of rebel groups relative to the government in onshore-rich countries,
while they reduce it in offshore-rich countries. Focusing on the most precisely
estimated effects in column (1), a one standard deviation increase in the price of
oil in large onshore producers like Iraq increases the number of rebel groups by




DPr  Onshore 0.156* 0.100 -0.069
(0.089) (0.084) (0.045)
DPr  Offshore -0.099** -0.262* 0.186**
(0.043) (0.147) (0.090)
N of countries 132 132 132
Observations 6,204 6,204 6,204
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is conflict onset; in column (2) conflict incidence; in column
(3) conflict termination. All columns refer to civil conflict, defined as internal armed conflict with more
than 25 battle-related deaths. All specifications include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. Significantly different from zero at the *90% level, **95% level, ***99% level.
See also notes to Table (2).
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0.04 points, or 13% of the mean number of active groups. For offshore-rich countries
like Azerbaijan, on the contrary, a similar oil price shock reduces the number of
groups by 0.03 points, or 10% of the mean number of groups.
The even columns of Table 4 additionally include the interaction between the
onshore-weighted price shock and an indicator variable equal to one for countries
subject to documented cases of oil looting, from the Rebel Contraband data set
(Walsh et al. 2018).28 Irrespective of the measure of strength considered, the esti-
mates indicate that oil lootability plays a crucial role in tipping the balance of power
in favour of the rebels during oil windfalls.
As in the previous case of conflict escalation, we can calculate the share of
onshore production above which oil windfalls raise the relative strength of the rebels
against the government (i.e., the fighting capacity threshold n in our model). The
estimates in column (1) indicate that when more than 49% of total oil production is
extracted onshore, the overall effect of an oil price shock is to increase the number of
rebel groups active in a country. Note that the fighting capacity threshold is larger
than the conflict equilibrium threshold, consistent with equation (3.6) in the theore-
tical model, although the two cannot be statistically distinguished from each other at
conventional levels of significance.
Table 4. Changes in Rebels’ Strength.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D Number D Average D Maximum
Rebel groups Rebel strength Rebel strength
DPr  Onshore 0.307* 0.212 0.304* 0.130 0.358** 0.128
(0.160) (0.202) (0.154) (0.214) (0.175) (0.221)
DPr  Offshore -0.291*** -0.626** -0.019 0.176 -0.061 0.068
(0.095) (0.255) (0.120) (0.316) (0.125) (0.328)
DPr  Onshore  Loot 3.774*** 3.605** 4.812***
(1.098) (1.691) (1.401)
N. of countries 132 132 132 132 132 132
Observations 6,204 2,640 6,204 2,640 6,204 2,640
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the change in the number of active rebel groups in
the country from period t-1 to t; in columns (3) and (4) it is the change in the average rebel strength score
across all rebel groups active in the country; in columns (5) and (6) it is the change in the rebel strength
score of the strongest rebel group in the country. In columns (2), (4) and (6) the variable DPr  Onshore is
interacted with Loot, an indicator variable equal to one for country-years with documented evidence of oil
looting during the period 1990-2009. These specifications also include the variable DPr  Loot (coefficient
not reported). All specifications include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the country level. Significantly different from zero at the *90% level, **95% level, ***99% level. See also
notes to Table (2) and Section 5 in the main text for information about the sources used in this Table.
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Robustness Checks
In this section we present a number of checks meant to probe the robustness of our
findings, focusing in particular on the effect of oil windfalls on conflict escalation
and de-escalation. We discuss robustness to: (i) an alternative weighting scheme;
(ii) inclusion of country-specific linear trends; (iii) accounting for the potentially
endogenous location of oil production; (iv) dropping countries where oil shares are
identified with relatively low accuracy; (v) dropping non-oil producers;
(vi) dropping large oil producers with the potential of influencing the world price.
The results are reported in Table 5, where the upper panel refers to conflict escala-
tion and the lower panel to de-escalation.
In column (1), we start by running our baseline specification with population
weights to recover effects for an average person in the population rather than for an
average country. Point estimates are effectively insensitive to the use of this alter-
native weighting scheme, and are largely in line with our baseline results.
In column (2), we include country-specific linear trends. This accounts for
the possibility that countries may have embarked on different conflict paths due
to trends in variables that may correlate with oil production (e.g., institutional or
economic development). The inclusion of country-specific trends does not affect
the baseline results, which continue to show an opposite and statistically sig-
nificant effect of oil wealth on the probability of conflict in onshore and off-
shore countries.
In column (3), we address the potential endogeneity of oil production to conflict.
One may worry, for example, that in periods of conflict a government may strate-
gically decide to move from onshore to offshore oil production, which is at lower
risk of being seized by the rebels. Or that a deterioration in the international eco-
nomic outlook may increase the probability of conflict in a country, while also
inducing the government to downsize the expensive offshore oil industry. We try
to assuage these concerns by replacing the average production weights (i.e., the y‘s)
by initial measures of onshore and offshore production, calculated in 1962. Fixing
the weights at the initial sample-year captures the country’s natural predisposition to
oil exploitation rather than the result of the balance of power between government
and rebels. The results using fixed weights are similar to our baseline results. If
anything, estimates of the parameter on the interaction term between the oil price
shock and the offshore share become larger (by around 70%) when considering
conflict escalation in the upper panel. In the lower panel, the point estimates on
both interaction terms remain similar but are less precisely estimated.
Columns (4) and (5) show the robustness of our results to only including countries
with high-quality information on the quantity of oil produced onshore and offshore.
Column (4) includes countries for which the average share of oil production is
calculated over more than half of the sample-years, while column (5) restricts the
sample to countries for which we observe onshore and offshore shares at least once
before 1986, which is the mid-point of the sample period. Both exercises lead to a



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































drop of about 20% of the sample observations. In spite of the reduction in the sample
size, the estimated effects remain precisely identified and in line with our baseline
results.
Columns (6) to (8) check the robustness of our results to the exclusion of very
small and very big producers. Since non-oil producing countries and countries
with very low shares of oil production in GDP are unlikely to be affected by oil
price changes, focusing on a smaller sample of countries with significant oil
shares is arguably a better test for our model. At the other end of the spectrum,
however, one might fear that our results are driven by a limited number of major
oil producers, whose expected future political developments have the potential to
affect the international oil prices. Column (6) excludes non-oil producers, which
represent one third of countries in our sample. The point estimates remain very
similar to the baseline specification, confirming that our main results are not
spuriously driven by non-oil producing countries. In column (7) we perform a
more stringent test, excluding any country-year observation in which total pro-
duction accounts for less than 5% of GDP. This amounts to including all observa-
tions for large producers, plus medium-size producers in years of significant oil
production or periods when the oil price level is relatively high. Despite the
considerable sample reduction, which only includes about one third of all obser-
vations, the results remain similar to the baseline specification. Finally, in column
(8) we exclude from the sample all countries belonging to the OPEC. The esti-
mates remain qualitatively similar, although in this case the effect on onshore oil
becomes marginally insignificant.29
Despite our results appear robust to sample selection and potential endogeneity in
oil’s location, one might still worry that onshore and offshore producers also differ in
other - political, socio-economic or institutional - dimensions that influence their
response to oil windfalls. If that is the case, the estimates of our key interaction
terms will be biased. To test for this possibility, in Table 6 we present estimates
of the parameters of the model where we interact oil price shocks not only with
onshore and offshore production shares, but also with a large array of observable
cross-country characteristics. We focus in particular on well-known correlates of
conflict - such as, for example, polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005),
colonial history (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Dell 2010), population, or
socioeconomic and geographical features (Fearon and Laitin 2003). As shown, only
about 10 percent of the coefficients on the additional interaction terms are significant
at the 10 percent level, which is no more than what can be expected if the patterns are
generated by chance. More importantly, our main coefficients of interest remain
largely in line with our baseline specifications - that is, the signs of the estimates are
consistent with our theoretical predictions across specifications - and the estimates
are also largely statistically significant. We conclude that our main results are not
likely generated by other country characteristics that happen to correlate with oil’s
location.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this paper, we re-examine the relationship between oil wealth and conflict, focusing
on the location of oil production and on the short-run effects of oil price changes. We
start from the observation that offshore and onshore oil facilities may be asymme-
trically appropriated by the parts in conflict, with the latter more likely to be attacked,
looted, and even seized by rebel groups, which can use the proceeds from the looting
to increase their fighting capacity. We formalize this insight in a standard conflict
model a la Tullock (1980), modified to account for the endogenous fighting capacity
of the opponents. The model predicts that an exogenous increase in oil wealth tilts the
balance of power in favour of the rebels when the share of onshore oil production in a
country exceeds a certain threshold. When onshore production is below this threshold,
instead, an increase in oil wealth raises relatively more the fighting capacity of the
government compared to the rebels. These heterogeneous effects on the relative
balance of power of the contenders in onshore and offshore producing countries, in
turn, have consequences for their level of conflict. Our model predicts that, following
an oil price windfall, conflict should escalate in onshore producing countries, while
the opposite should happen in offshore producing countries, where most of the profits
associated to oil windfalls accrue to the government.
Our empirical results from a large panel of countries support these predictions:
exogenous spikes in the price of oil on international markets appear to escalate
conflict in onshore-rich countries and to de-escalate it in offshore-rich ones. We
also provide evidence consistent with our interpretation of the results, by showing
that changes in the relative fighting capacity of rebels and governments – measured
by their observed abilities to maintain and equip troops – depend on the location of
oil. Finally, by aggregating over the onshore and offshore effects of oil price wind-
falls, we show that the two almost exactly offset each other, plausibly explaining the
zero average effect of oil wealth on conflict found in recent studies.
While our results indicate that onshore-rich countries are more prone to civil
conflict, this is not to say that offshore-oil abundance necessarily represents a bles-
sing for the citizens of a country. Indeed, offshore oil revenues have often guaran-
teed steady resources and increased stability to oppressive governments, like in
Congo, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. An overall welfare assessment of the con-
sequences of oil abundance and its location remains a first order question for future
research.
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Notes
1. The auto-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) has repeatedly made the
headlines and its financing through oil has been extensively analyzed by the media, see,
e.g.: http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/?ftcamp¼engage/email/topics/topics/inside_isis/
crmutm_source¼topicsutm_medium¼emailutm_term¼topicsutm_campaign¼inside_
isis “Inside Isis Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil” (Financial Times 2015). Other
examples of journalistic accounts of sabotage, oil-theft and looting of onshore oil fields
in different countries include, but are not limited to, Libya (http://www.wsj.com/articles/
libyan-oil-guards-prepare-to-take-on-islamic-state-1425486673?mod¼wsj_nview_latest
“Libya Declares Force Majeur Over Oil Fields in Central Region”, The Wall Street
Journal, 2015), Nigeria (https://www.ft.com/content/0ea77f2e-def4-11e5-b072-006d8d3
62ba3 “Renewed Delta violence reignites fears for Nigeria oil production”, Financial
Times, 2016) and South Sudan (http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/index.php/
2015/05/21/south-sudans-rebels-prepare-to-attack-paloch-oilfields/” South Sudan’s
rebels prepare to attack Paloch oilfields”, SSNA, 2015).
2. The group’s leader, Hasan di Tiro, bid for an oil contract in 1974 but lost to a U.S.
company, while in the run-up to the 1976 conflict the group was responsible for numerous
episodes of extortion against Exxon Mobil to induce the company to pay “protection
fees” for its gas plant in Aceh.
3. In addition to the examples mentioned here, oil looting and extortion have been docu-
mented in many countries such as Nigeria, India, Colombia, Mozambique, Russia, Iraq
and Syria (see, e.g. Walsh et al. 2018). Moreover, our mechanism is also consistent with
cases where rebel groups actively reduce the government’s onshore oil revenue, as in the
case of the Niger Delta conflict (e.g. Rexer and Hvinden 2020). Hard data on government
surplus destruction is, however, less available.
4. In a similar spirit, Fetzer and Marden (2017) show that contestability of land title is
associated to conflict. While their results refer to a form of “institutional lootability”,
we consider “technical lootability” of natural resources.
5. Relatedly, Paine (2016) argues that oil fuels separatist conflicts but not conflicts to
capture the central government.
6. In the real world, looting may come in the form of bunkering of oil pipelines (as in the
Niger delta or in Mexico), extortion of oil companies (as in the case of Colombia), or
outright occupation of oil production facilities and refineries (as in the case of ISIL).
7. Alternatively, one could assume that some share o of the offshore oil is also looted by the
opposition. All our main results are confirmed as long as onshore oil is more susceptible
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to looting than offshore oil, i.e. if o < d. Our results are also preserved if we assume,
albeit less realistically, that the opposition controls all of the onshore resources while the
government controls all of the offshore resources, i.e. d ¼ 1. Finally, while d could be
endogenized, our main results on the overall conflict equilibrium are maintained as long
as d > 0.
8. Consistent with our empirical setup, we restrict attention to mechanisms that may be
relevant in the short run, while we disregard long-run mechanisms such as changes in
investment and exploration policies, political and military strategies, strategic alliance
formation, and geo-political dynamics. See Van der Ploeg and Rohner (2012) for a
dynamic conflict model on the endogenous determination of both conflict and resource
extraction, or Aslaksen and Torvik (2006) for the joint determination of political and
conflict equilibria.
9. That a group conflict technology is endogenous to its resource revenues is consistent with
the argument and the empirical patterns in, for example, Berman et al. (2017).
10. More formally, pG > 1=2 requires f
G RGð Þ > f O ROð Þ at any shapes of f i Rið Þ when
dn < 1=2. We make this assumption throughout. We could easily relax this assumption
without changing our main results, but at the cost of tractability.
11. The results in the expressions and propositions follows from straightforward algebra. For
a more detailed presentation of the derivation, see Online Appendix A.1.
12. Notice that O is an inversely U-shaped function of pi but that we restrict our analysis to
the part of O that is downward-sloping in pG (because pG > 1=2).
13. Notice that dO
dpG
¼ 1 2pGð Þ < 0, since pG > 1=2.
14. The term 1
12pGð ÞjGR < 0 is negative because, by our assumptions, 2pG > 1, while both jG
and R are positive. We assume 1 < 1
12pGð ÞjGR
< 0, to ensure that n > 0.
15. Online Appendix A.2 offers a more detailed derivation.
16. To see that there exists an equilibrium where a positive oil price shock has negative
conflict effects (i.e., the case where n < n), note that the term jGR in equation (3.6) may
be arbitrarily large, depending on the exact shape of the fighting capacity function fi Rið Þ
and on the economy’s oil revenues. Evaluating equation (3.6) in the limiting case where
jGR!1 – that is, when the fighting capacities are strongly (infinitely) responsive to
changes in oil revenues (at any given level of gOG) – the equilibrium conflict threshold
converges to the fighting capacity threshold (n ! n), which is positive (for any value of
d 2 0; 1ð  and gOG > 0).
17. Online Appendix A.3 present a more detailed derivation of the mapping between equa-
tion (3.5) in the theoretical model and equation (4.1) in the empirical model, including
how this mapping informs our key hypotheses on the signs and relative sizes on the
estimated coefficients in the empirical model.
18. See Online Appendix A.3 for a more detailed derivation.
19. Price is money-of-the-day, as the correlation between real and nominal percentage
changes in the price in this period is 99.7%. Data are available at http://www.bp.com/
en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.htmlwww.
bp.com.
26 Journal of Conflict Resolution XX(X)
20. First, an augmented Dickey Fuller test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the series
contains a unit root. Second, since unit root tests have notoriously low power against
competing alternative (Cochrane 1991) we complement it with the Kwiatkowski test for
time-series stationarity, which rejects the null at the 95% confidence level. Finally, the
Lo-MacKinlay test, which more specifically tests for the time series being a random walk,
fails to reject the null at conventional levels. All three tests therefore indicate, under
alternative null hypotheses, that the oil price series in levels is best characterized as a
random walk process. Applying the same tests on the first-difference of the oil price series
gives evidence against a unit root at the 99% confidence level, and strongly indicates that
the first-difference of the oil price is stationary.
21. In the empirical analysis below, we also consider variables capturing the subset of
conflict onsets and terminations only.
22. There are only about 20-25 recorded cases in our data where the rebels are coded as
stronger than the government (i.e., where the rebel strength variable takes on the values 4
or 5). This corresponds to less than 3% of the total number of conflict observations
(¼ 850). The fact that the government is usually stronger than the rebels is consistent
with the assumptions made in our theoretical model.
23. In country-years when there is no conflict we code the rebel strength indicator to zero,
indicating non-active rebel groups.
24. These figures are based on the estimates in column (2) and are calculated as [(0.229 x
0.04 x 0.29)/0.033] and [(-0.143 x 0.024 x 0.29)/0.033].
25. In the empirical model, equation (4.1), the threshold is defined as the level of n at which
the marginal effect of a price change is zero, such that b1nþ b2 1 nð Þ ¼ 0. This implies
n¼- b2/(b1- b2). Using our estimates of b1 and b2 from Table 2, Column (2), we thus have
n ¼[0.143/(0.229þ0.143)] 0.38.
26. The estimates refer to instances of civil conflict. Results for civil war, available upon
request, are qualitatively similar but less precisely estimated.
27. Iraq’s onshore oil share is 45% of GDP; its probability of conflict onset is compared to
that of countries of equal or larger onshore share, which is 0.01. Azerbaijan’s offshore
share of GDP is 40%; its probability of onset (termination) is compared to that of
countries of equal or larger offshore share, which is 0.049 and 0.042 respectively.
28. These countries are Colombia, India, Indonesia, Sudan, Iraq, Russia, Congo, Nigeria.
29. Our simple theory of conflict is predicated on the idea that what matters is the change in oil
income relative to the size of the economy. This is because both the government and the
opposition compare their respective shares of oil income – and variations in these due to oil
price changes – to the opportunity cost of fighting, which is captured by the size of the
economy (GDP). In Appendix Table A2, we replace our preferred measure of resource
dependence (the ratio of oil production to GDP) with an alternative measure of resource
abundance (the ratio of oil production to population size). We obtain qualitatively iden-
tical, but less precisely estimated, results. This is as expected: as the oil intensity measure
effectively constitutes a set of country weights for the oil price changes, changing these
weights to something less consistent with our theorized mechanisms preserves the basic
pattern but reduces our ability to precisely estimate the effects of oil price changes.
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